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Abstract 
 
The people responsible for building the IT products 
and infrastructure of tomorrow – today’s students of 
the computing disciplines – oftentimes do not have the 
opportunity or proper motivation to develop 
cybersecurity skills meeting the needs of the job 
market. This paper introduces High Fidelity Live 
eXercises (HiFLiX) a teaching/learning activity 
designed to expose students to cybersecurity 
challenges resembling those they could face in a future 
work environment. We describe a HiFLiX prototype 
study, conducted as a collaboration between the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s CyberSecurity 
@CSAIL research group and NASA’s Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory. Our analysis indicates that the proposed 
delivery method met the stipulated cybersecurity 
educational outcomes and increased the motivation for 
future cybersecurity studies in the majority of 
participants. Two previously unknown software flaws 
were also discovered.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The rapid spread and adoption of Information and 
Communications Technology have put computing1 
engineers in high demand. However, as products, 
services and even critical infrastructures have become 
targets of antagonistic cyberattacks, recruiting 
computing experts who also have an adequate 
understanding of cybersecurity2 has quickly become a 
priority. Nevertheless, recruiting talent in this field has 
proved to be a challenge. Hiring managers are 
struggling to find candidates for open positions and 
estimates project that several million cybersecurity-
related positions will be vacant in the coming years 
[1][2]. 
                                                 
1 Refers to the five ACM computing disciplines Software 
Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Information 
Systems, and Information Technology. 
2 Defined as a “computing-based discipline involving technology, 
people, information, and processes to enable assured operations. It 
involves the creation, operation, analysis, and testing of secure 
computer systems.” [3] 
While the number of Bachelor’s and Master’s 
graduates from engineering programs within the 
computing sciences have doubled over the last decade 
[4], students are generally not provided with the 
learning options leading to the cybersecurity expertise 
sought after by the market. Several reports have 
pointed to the need of developing curricular guidelines 
for cybersecurity education [5][6]. 
The relatively few students who have studied 
security at university have oftentimes been exposed to 
courses that are entirely theoretical, dealing with 
principles and concepts rather than practice [7]. While 
a class on computer security may cover such 
foundational principles as the Bell-LaPadula model [8] 
in depth, the students seldom get the chance to apply 
their knowledge in practice, to develop independent 
thinking, or to experience what a real-world 
cybersecurity challenge may entail. While it is 
important that students learn the theory (the “why”), 
training them to apply theory (the “how”) is also 
needed [9]. As recently noted by the ABET 
accreditation organization, the incorporation of hands-
on and practical cybersecurity instruction is a key part 
in modernizing engineering education [10]. 
In this paper, the research question we seek to 
answer is how practical cybersecurity exercises could 
be designed to contribute significantly to educational 
outcomes in this area. Our proposed delivery method 
targets the use of hands-on cybersecurity skills. This is 
done by exposing students to real-world systems and 
mentoring them through realistic challenges, through a 
collaboration between academia and industry. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
reviews previous literature, Section 3 describes 
security training exercises, Section 4 describes the 
experimental setup, Section 5 outlines the results, 
which are further discussed in Section 6. Our 
conclusions are offered in in Section 7. 
 
2. Related work  
 
A considerable number of research papers 
published during the last four decades deal with 
investigations towards software engineering education 
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from many different points of view. This section 
provides an overview of the major trends in 
cybersecurity education during the last decades and 
suggests some relevant literature. 
Although the nomenclature has evolved, the 
question of how to best teach engineering students 
cybersecurity is far from new. Many of the founding 
principles of cybersecurity, at least in a technical sense, 
can be traced back to the 1970s. The seminal paper 
“Security Controls for Computer Systems” [11] 
broadened the scope of computer security to include 
protection of the data itself, limiting unauthorized 
access. The “CIA triad” of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability defined in 1975 is a core tenant of 
cybersecurity education [12]. 
By way of the World Wide Web, the Internet was 
brought to wider use during the end of the 80s. This 
increased the importance of cybersecurity, as 
emphasized by the ACM Task Force on the Core of 
Computer Science [13]. Similarly, in their Master of 
Software Engineering Curriculum from 1989, the 
Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie 
Mellon University suggested that topics such as 
security, along with privacy and software piracy, 
should be discussed in context in all courses to set 
examples for students [14]. 
In the 1990s, security started to become more 
visible in various engineering curricula. For instance, 
in the then emerging field of real-time computing, 
security had a natural role [15]. At the 1996 IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, a special panel 
was held to gather input from industry on cybersecurity 
teaching requirements [16]. In their paper “Integrating 
Security into the Curriculum” [17] Irvine, Chin and 
Frincke establish that “the education [in engineering 
programs] must result in graduates prepared for the 
security challenges they will encounter in their 
professional roles,” but that “too few computer science 
and engineering programs today [1998] pay adequate 
attention to security”. They also underscore that 
educational outcomes must be consistent with those of 
the larger engineering context. This is in accordance 
with the established concept of Constructive 
Alignment, used within the subject of pedagogy in 
higher education [18]. 
Bertrand Meyer [19] highlights the importance of 
“teaching by doing,” an approach necessary in 
preparing students for professional cybersecurity 
challenges. In 2004 a joint ACM-IEEE task force on 
Computing Curricula published the Software 
Engineering 2004 (SE2004) Curriculum Guidelines for 
Undergraduate Degree Programs in Software 
Engineering [20]. While SE2004 includes several 
components relating to security, security still was not 
defined as an independent knowledge area. 
The President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Board [21] illustrated in 2003 how flaws in computer 
software can lead to serious vulnerabilities in critical 
infrastructure. For this purpose, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) formed a group with the 
task of defining a Common Body of Knowledge for 
secure software assurance [22], where one of its stated 
goals was to drive curriculum development in 
academic institutions. The Carnegie Mellon SEI was 
subsequently enlisted by the DHS to develop a 
curriculum for a Master of Software Assurance degree 
program [23]. In the paper “Foundations for Software 
Assurance” Woody, Mead and Shoemaker define 
principles underpinning a curriculum for such a 
Master’s program [24]. Tom Hilburn and Dan 
Shoemaker [25] discuss the security competency 
required in the software engineering profession and 
present models for competency management. 
In 2015 the Joint Task Force on Cybersecurity 
Education was chartered by the ACM Education 
Board. Their publication Cybersecurity Curricula 2017 
[26] is the to-date latest progression in curricula 
development in the field. Important learning outcomes 
include forensic analysis, penetration testing, ethical 
hacking, and offensive techniques. 
 
3. Security Training Exercises  
 
Hands-on computing exercises have been 
demonstrated as a very effective method of teaching 
and learning cybersecurity [27]. Such exercises engage 
learners and allow them to practice and hone essential 
cyber-skills, recognized as a necessity by the majority 
of the educational and professional communities [28]. 
There are several methods for introducing students to 
security problems using training exercises. Perhaps the 
most well-known are Capture the Flag (CTF) 
competitions. CTFs are designed to encourage students 
to find vulnerabilities in a designated computing 
environment that was built for the specific purpose of 
training. The predetermined vulnerabilities are 
generally marked by “flags” which consist of a string. 
Upon discovering the vulnerability, CTF participants 
“capture” the flag by copying and pasting the string 
into a validation website to receive points. 
There are two types of CTFs – Jeopardy and 
Attack-Defense. For Jeopardy CTFs, participants are 
provided categories of security issues and techniques 
that must be found and executed (e.g. Web, Binary, 
Reversing.) In many cases, the categories are 
sequential. For Attack-Defense CTFs, all teams are 
provided computing infrastructure they must defend 
while simultaneously tasked with attacking others’ 
infrastructure. Flags are recovered when identifying 
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and submitting vulnerabilities in the team’s own 
infrastructure which are subsequently patched. Flags 
are also recovered when a vulnerability is found in an 
opposing team’s infrastructure. Points are awarded for 
submitting these flags. CTF rules of engagement, and 
point distribution vary across CTFs. For examples of 
different CTFs, see [29][30][31]. 
While CTFs provide a dynamic environment for 
students to learn about security, there are several 
disadvantages to their structure. First, CTFs are high 
intensity environments that require participants to have 
a knowledge base of security to be successful. There is 
very little opportunity to teach new skills during a 
CTF. Therefore, it is easy for less experienced 
participants to get left behind those that have more 
experience. Participants can of course learn by 
watching, but it is not an optimal environment for 
learning new skills due to the time pressure. Another 
learning challenge during Jeopardy style CTFs is that 
they are structured in category stages where capturing 
one group of flags for a category – such as Web, will 
unlock the next category of flags. The sequential 
unlocking of tasks limits participant’s educational 
exploration because it is easy to get stuck on a certain 
task and be unable to try different exercises. 
On a higher level, CTFs also lack a fundamental 
component of cybersecurity education – helping 
students connect the dots between existing 
vulnerabilities and their origin. When breaking and 
entering, and quick-and-dirty patching, is the rewarded 
driver of an exercise, focus on understanding 
cybersecurity principles and their best practice 
application is lost.  
One of our goals in developing the High-Fidelity 
Live Exercises (HiFLiX) was to encourage participants 
to think in terms of the “cyber kill chain” – a 
description of the sequence of steps often used by 
adversaries in real-world situations [32]. Rather than to 
follow sequential predefined tasks we wanted the 
students to consider how the model could be used to 
attack a system, but simultaneously what flaws that 
allowed them to do so, and what security controls that 
could be applied to prevent a successful attack. 
Further, we also wanted to capture participant attack 
data which would mimic real adversarial activity. 
To achieve realism in both exercise environment 
and attack patterns, we designed a system with 
networked hosts running NASA mission software and 
services, including any pre-existing vulnerabilities. The 
exercise would thus simulate a real-world environment 
with high fidelity. Our hypothesis was that the 
participants would find it more educational and 
motivating to be exposed to real-world systems and 
challenges, as opposed to the limited framework-style 
environments that students are commonly presented 
with in classroom labs. 
 
4. Experiment  
 
4.1 Overview 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, our proposed 
HiFLiX differs from other forms of competition-style 
exercises on several accounts. It introduces the 
participants to a real-world system environment, a 
replica of a system used in production, instead of a 
fictitious, competition-specific system. It also runs 
over a longer period of time (in this case five days) and 
offers continuous instructional support and guidance. 
The exercise is not set up as a game or competition, but 
rather a learning experience with a partially open-
ended set of objectives. The experimental HiFLiX 
described here was arranged as a collaboration between 
the Cyber Defense Engineering and Research Group at 
the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) 
CyberSecurity@CSAIL research group. It was 
developed by JPL and offered to students at the MIT 
Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence 
Laboratory (CSAIL) during the last week of MIT’s 
four-week winter break independent activities period 
(IAP) in January 2018. As the experiment was hosted 
virtually using cloud services, the students pre-
registered for the experiment could take part either 
from a computer lab at MIT, from their own home, or 
any other place they chose. 
 
The experiment had the following main goals: 
 
(i) Evaluate if this type of exercise would satisfy 
cybersecurity learning outcomes;3 
(ii) Gather data for cybersecurity-related research and 
development tasks; and 
(iii) Improve awareness of new attacker tools, tactics 
and procedures. 
 
A total of thirteen students actively participated in 
the experiment.4 They were tasked with achieving a set 
of HiFLiX objectives in a network environment 
configured to closely resemble a NASA mission 
system. These included identifying and documenting 
system weaknesses that could be exploited to extract 
information. Some well-known exploitable flaws and 
misconfigurations were intentionally planted, while 
                                                 
3 Targeting the understanding and applying levels of the Bloom’s 
Revised Taxonomy, see: http://ccecc.acm.org/assessment/blooms/. 
4 Only about half of the students who had initially signed up to 
participate ended up doing so. 
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also allowing for the possibility of finding previously 
unknown vulnerabilities. Six students completed at 
least one of the stipulated objectives, and two students 
completed all the objectives. In addition, two 
previously unknown Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
vulnerabilities were found in mission software. 
 
4.2 Design 
 
We summarize our design choices and rationale 
into four categories, described below. 
 
Problem design. The HiFLiX was organized to 
encourage participation across a mix of hacker skills.5 
A pre-event survey indicated that almost 52% of the 
potential participants were newbies with very little or 
almost no knowledge of hacking, 26% were familiar 
with hacking and 21% were experts in hacking. This 
mix of skillset meant that our HiFLiX design had to 
contain a mix of simple and complex problems to be 
accessible and to be of interest to all types of 
participants, from newbies to experts. Our problem 
design strategy involved the following. 
Traditionally, security exercises are very time 
constrained. This limits the ability for students to learn 
at their own pace. Further, objectives for security 
exercises that are staged as described above limits 
students’ ability to try new objectives when they are 
stuck on a problem. To avoid these constraints, we 
attempted to apply a constructivist learning model to 
the HiFLiX. This Montessori-style pedagogy is 
intended to promote discovery and diffuse frustration 
caused by traditional educational training boundaries. 
The Montessori pedagogy has been shown to be 
successful beyond primary education [33]. In the spirit 
of this educational approach, we chose to fully 
virtualize the HiFLiX environment, maximizing the 
flexibility of the exercise.  We provided a window of 
five days to complete the HiFLiX so the students can 
learn and approach the objectives at a speed with 
which they are comfortable. Also, we chose to allow 
students to attempt any objective in any order. This 
design decision was to enable participants to start with 
whatever objective they found most interesting or 
accessible so that they did not become discouraged by 
the exercise. 
We chose to rely on usage of such well-known and 
freely available cybersecurity tools as Metasploit6 and 
John the Ripper7 to solve most of the HiFLiX 
problems. To make it easier, we provided students with 
                                                 
5 Here referring to aptitude in applied cybersecurity, including 
computer system vulnerability evaluation and penetration testing. 
6 https://www.metasploit.com/ 
7 https://www.openwall.com/john/ 
the popular penetration tester’s toolkit Kali Linux,8 a 
popular Linux distribution which comes pre-packaged 
with a variety of tools for digital forensics and 
vulnerability identification. This ensured that the 
newbies would get a chance to learn new yet very 
relevant tools by participating in the HiFLiX, while the 
familiar and expert category participants could hone 
their skills in the usage of these tools, or use their own 
if they so preferred. 
We embedded a few well-known vulnerabilities 
and very common system misconfigurations to ensure 
that all students could make progress in the HiFLiX 
and advance their cybersecurity skills by quickly 
identifying exploitable vulnerabilities common in real 
software and systems. For example, we planted the 
well-known Bash Shellshock vulnerability (CVE-
2014-6271)9 and the more recent SambaCry (CVE-
2017-7494) in a few of the systems. These 
vulnerabilities could be discovered directly through 
Metasploit. 
We planted some advanced vulnerabilities which 
required some research and thought to challenge the 
familiar and expert category participants. For example, 
we planted a Java deserialization vulnerability in one 
of the systems, which required participants to first 
discover this vulnerability, and then use a combination 
of tools to verify that it could be exploited. 
Finally, we provided the experts with a system 
containing real mission software and services and 
challenged them to find previously unknown (zero-
day) vulnerabilities. Overall, we designed at least two 
of the three HiFLiX objectives (described in Section 
4.5) to be solvable by most participants and had one 
objective specifically targeted at the experts. 
 
Infrastructure design. Our original strategy for the 
HiFLiX consisted of us sending pre-packaged virtual 
machines to each of the individual participants. This 
was an easy approach and would have eliminated any 
requirement for complex infrastructure setup and 
management, but unfortunately it also made it 
impossible for us to gain any real time visibility into 
the actions of the participants, and monitor data from 
the hosts in any meaningful way. It would have also 
made it difficult for us to troubleshoot problems and 
assist the participants. Remotely hosting the HiFLiX 
on JPL’s infrastructure was another option but it was 
fraught with security concerns and addressing those 
concerns would have required a massive effort both in 
terms of procuring the necessary approvals and the 
engineering. We finally settled on hosting the HiFLiX 
remotely on the Amazon AWS cloud. This enabled us 
                                                 
8 https://www.kali.org/ 
9 https://cve.mitre.org/ 
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to construct a sophisticated and secure virtual 
environment for each participant within a couple of 
weeks. In addition, this also allowed us to fully 
instrument the virtual machines and the virtual 
networks for monitoring purposes and provided us near 
complete control over all the aspects of the 
environment, utilizing a web dashboard from the West 
coast with the students located on the East coast. 
Hosting the HiFLiX on the cloud also allowed us to 
easily scale to a large number of participants within a 
matter of minutes. In the end, this proved to be a cost-
effective solution both in terms of the time required to 
setup and manage, and the overall cost of the resources 
required to make the event a success. 
 
4.3 Technical environment 
 
We simulated a portion of a real mission network 
for each participant, with three virtual machine hosts. 
The missionweb simulates a web server which is 
accessible from the internet. We use a stock install of 
Red Hat Linux 7.3 along with a version the Apache 
web server. The missionfs simulates a file server, 
which is accessible only from the web server and other 
machines inside the network. We again use a stock 
install of Red Hat Linux 7.3 with various file sharing 
software such as ftpd, NFS and smbd installed on it. 
The missiondb is a real mission database server and 
contains the base installation of real mission software.  
All these three hosts are grouped into a single subnet. 
The hosts were also logically isolated by way of port 
and protocol filtering so we could control what was 
visible from one host to the next.  This provided us the 
ability to slowly expose more to the attacker as they 
progressed through the network from host to host.  
Another subnet was used to simulate the external 
adversary and consisted of one virtual machine 
containing the Kali Linux distribution. Students were 
only given direct access to this Kali Linux host, and 
they had then to navigate their way into the mission 
network to accomplish the HiFLiX objectives.  
The environment, shown in Figure 1, was 
replicated for each participant in the AWS cloud. Each 
environment was instantiated as an Amazon Virtual 
Private Cloud (VPC), which provided logical isolation 
between each participant and ensured that they could 
not interfere with each other’s environments. 
Each host was instrumented to collect exercise data, 
including network traffic, shell command history, disk 
transactions, and system logs. In addition, flow logs 
were enabled for each VPC in the AWS cloud 
environment. This enabled monitoring the traffic 
coming into and out of each VPC and between the 
subnets. All data, except packet captures, was fed into 
a Splunk10 infrastructure in real-time, and each 
participant’s data was tagged uniquely for future attack 
analysis. 
 
4.4 Vulnerabilities and misconfigurations 
 
The following is a summary of the vulnerabilities 
and misconfigurations planted across the hosts. 
 
missionweb contained the Heartbleed (CVE-2014-
0160) and Shellshock vulnerabilities exposed via the 
Apache webserver, in addition to an SSH 
misconfiguration which contained weak and easy 
brute-forced passwords for several accounts on the 
system. 
missionfs contained vulnerabilities in the proftpd 
FTP server, dnsmasq service, the sambacry 
vulnerability in smbd, a privilege escalation 
vulnerability in the sudo binary, and an NFS 
misconfiguration which allowed the whole directory 
structure to be mounted as root. 
missiondb contained real mission software and was 
largely left untouched to encourage discovery of zero-
day vulnerabilities. The only vulnerability planted was 
a Java deserialization vulnerability which was added 
on top of the existing vulnerable ActiveMQ software 
running on the host. 
 
4.5 Objectives and Rules of Engagement 
 
A welcome email was sent to the participants a 
couple of days before the exercise. It described the 
overall HiFLiX infrastructure, laid out the objectives, 
set out the rules of engagement and the reporting 
requirements.  
The participants were made aware that the HiFLiX 
exercise was designed to accommodate different levels 
of previous experience in working with cybersecurity, 
                                                 
10 https://www.splunk.com/ 
 
 
Figure 1. Simulation of a portion of a real mission network 
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and cater to a mix of hacker skills. For beginners, a 
main benefit would be to familiarize themselves with 
new security tools to discover and document realistic 
vulnerabilities in systems configured to resemble those 
supporting NASA’s missions. Students with more 
experience in penetration testing would have an 
opportunity to explore complex attack scenarios that 
may require use of advanced exploitation techniques to 
discover unknown vulnerabilities. The three objectives 
that were set forth were the following. 
Objective A was to penetrate the simulated mission 
network and extract information from the mission 
telemetry database (identified as missiondb). The 
specific information to extract consists of an 
administrative username and password stored within 
the MySQL database running on that system. 
Objective B was to find and report at least eight of 
the vulnerabilities (either planted or zero-days) along 
with a proof-of-concept across the systems. 
Objective C was to perform a security assessment 
of the mission telemetry database and find at least one 
significant configuration error or vulnerability in that 
system. 
A Slack channel (a popular messaging platform) 
was setup for communication between the organizers 
and the participants, and between the participants 
themselves. Students were encouraged to offer general 
support to other participants when possible but to 
refrain from providing specifics or clear paths to the 
solutions. Tips and hints regarding the exercise were 
shared over Slack as the competition progressed. 
Participants were also made aware that log and packet 
data from the event was being collected. A list of rules 
of engagement was shared with all the participants. 
This included bans on disabling any of the exercise 
monitoring tools, transferring content out of the 
exercise environment, disclosing any discovered 
vulnerabilities, and sharing used exploits. 
 
5. Results  
 
The experiment ran according to plan and was 
successful in terms of student participation, how well 
they were able to fulfil the exercise objectives, and the 
amount of data gathered from the HiFLiX. In total, 
thirteen students participated in the experiment, with 
six students completing at least one objective. Two 
students completed all the objectives. 
 
5.1 Participant survey 
 
Eight of the thirteen participants answered the post-
event online survey, consisting of a set of questions 
with multiple choice as well as free text answer 
options. While we acknowledge that the sample size is 
not statistically significant and thus does not allow for 
declarative judgement, the results are used as 
qualitative indicators of success. The respondents were 
asked to answer questions related to their personal 
impression of the exercise, to rate its perceived 
difficulty level, to comment on its design and setup, to 
describe their own cybersecurity competence level 
before and after the exercise, and to estimate of how 
well they believe they had reached the educational 
outcomes of the exercise. Some of the more interesting 
results of the survey are brought up below. 
Six respondents were fully satisfied with the 
exercise and none were disappointed. Two respondents 
felt that the exercise could have been improved, mainly 
referring to technical issues related to reaching the 
objectives and to a perceived lack of documentation. 
Five respondents found the exercise at the right 
difficulty level, whereas three thought that is was too 
hard. Six respondents found the allotted time for the 
experiment (five days) to be adequate, whereas two 
found it too short. Six respondents would prefer this 
type of exercise over a traditional Capture-the-Flag 
competition. Several respondents mention that being 
exposed to real software and vulnerabilities increased 
their motivation for the exercise. All the respondents 
answered that they had learned a lot or gained 
experience they considered to be valuable. 
In the free text answers, several interesting 
comments were given by the respondents. One person 
mentions that a great benefit of this exercise, in 
comparison to previous CTF experiences, was its 
educational purpose. “This [exercise] helped us learn a 
lot since the staff was on standby to help guide, or give 
hints to, the students.” Another respondent also 
mentions the “responsiveness” of the staff to assist and 
instruct during the exercise. Several respondents 
mention appreciating working on “real mission 
servers,” and indicate that this was what had motivated 
them to take part in the experiment. “I enjoyed having 
to start with nothing and check everything for possible 
vulnerabilities, along with how to exploit them.” 
Of the more critical feedback provided in the 
survey, most comments were focused on challenges 
with the exercise. “I was confused about what I should 
do in the first place, but that could be because I’m 
inexperienced in [finding vulnerabilities in] real 
software.” One respondent mentions spending too 
much time on a task which did not contribute to 
reaching the objectives, but goes on to reflect on that 
this also resulted in a learning experience. Suggestions 
given for future improvements include handing out 
instructions longer in advance of the exercise and 
providing more hints to the participants during the 
exercise days. 
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6. Discussion  
 
As this study is limited in scope, and the number of 
participants in the experiment was relatively small, we 
cannot claim that the outcomes are replicable and 
generalizable for future exercises. However, we 
believe there are considerable insights we can draw 
from this research, to continue improving methods for 
hands-on cybersecurity education. 
 
Choose-your-own-adventure works. In scoping the 
HiFLiX, we aimed to develop a learning experience 
tailored to the individual student. This entailed meeting 
the students at their existing level of cybersecurity 
education. In the spirit of Montessori approaches, and 
unlike most CTFs, there were no qualifiers, minimum 
skill requirements/prerequisites. This enabled students 
who were complete novices to explore a new software 
environment and promoted their general software 
engineering exposure by allowing them to explore a 
JPL mission system. Some participants commented it 
was their first time using Kali Linux tools and the 
ability to test the tools out in a safe place was valuable. 
The more experienced participants were motivated to 
find zero-day vulnerabilities in the environment 
because it was a real mission system. When problem 
sets are designed for CTFs, experienced participants 
get into the habit of searching for certain 
vulnerabilities that are token problems for such 
exercises. Because the software engineering team that 
developed this real mission system did not even know 
all the vulnerabilities therein, the students were 
encouraged to think outside of the normal CTF-type 
flags. This was reflected in one student’s feedback on 
“start with nothing and check everything.” 
Additionally, a motivation for these security exercises 
is always bragging rights. Finding zero-days for a 
NASA JPL mission system provided ultimate bragging 
rights – especially for MIT hackers. Nevertheless, 
partnering with an industry or government actor from 
the local area/region would in essence fill the same 
educational purpose. 
 
Support is essential. Student feedback revealed that 
the choose-your-own-adventure was only successful 
because of the support provided by the JPL team. The 
structure of traditional cybersecurity exercises provides 
boundaries and comfortable tasks to students. The 
comparatively less rigid environment of the HiFLiX 
required a support infrastructure that enabled quick 
response times to student queries. Part of meeting the 
students where their skills were required hands-on 
educational communication. Students often asked the 
support team questions like “how do I use a XYZ tool” 
or “what can I try next?” The success of this HiFLiX 
relied on bringing a live classroom experience to a live 
security exercise, where fundamental security tests and 
approaches were taught virtually while a student tried 
to “hack away” at the exercise. While some CTFs may 
have labeled this hands-on teaching environment as 
“cheating,” we encouraged it so students would feel 
supported in their experience and not abandon the 
exercise in frustration. 
 
A win-win-win for academia, industry and students. 
Developing security exercises are generally either a 
labor of love or a source of revenue. Academic 
institutions build security exercises for students to 
inspire future generations of security researchers and 
analysts. Organizing such events is no easy or 
inexpensive feat for the academy, considering the time 
and resources required to develop problems, transport 
students to the cyber range and host the infrastructure. 
Beyond academic institutions hosting security 
exercises there is also a cottage industry of security 
companies hosting events targeted at hackers training 
for high-profile security competitions such as 
DEFCON. Hackers pay to participate in these events 
and trainings. In this case, MIT’s CyberSecurity 
@CSAIL research consortium partnered with NASA 
JPL to host the event virtually. Through this 
partnership, MIT was able to provide cost-free security 
education to its students. The costs were instead 
incurred by NASA JPL who spent considerable time 
designing and constructing the exercise, as well as 
supporting the participants. 
Nevertheless, JPL realized considerable value from 
hosting the event. An ongoing challenge for JPL, as for 
many other organizations, is attracting high quality 
software engineering security talent. This exercise 
provided a forum for JPL to connect and work with 
talented MIT students who expressed interest in 
learning more about their work, thus paving the way 
for recruiting opportunities. Compared to traditional 
recruiting methods, JPL was able to interact with these 
students and determine who might be a fit for their 
organization based on how the participants approached 
the exercise technically and even socially. 
Another major benefit to JPL was that the relatively 
open-ended forum allowed the participants to search 
for zero-day vulnerabilities against the mission system. 
Participants’ attacks on the mission system during the 
HiFLiX were captured for analysis. JPL is now using 
this data to identify common attack patterns against 
their mission systems to better detect attacks as they 
occur against their networks. Two zero-day 
vulnerabilities were found by the students which JPL 
was able to verify, mitigate and ultimately patch. As a 
result, the HiFLiX acted as a low-cost security audit 
for the mission system. 
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From a student perspective, the benefits of 
participating in the exercise are perhaps obvious, but 
worth reiterating. Students were able to learn security 
tools and techniques in a safe environment without the 
constraints of CTFs and other more traditional security 
training events. Further, students were working on a 
real-life mission system that was representative of 
security challenges that are found in industry. Finally, 
students received real-time support from the teams that 
work with these mission systems daily and were given 
guidance as to how to approach the objectives 
presented.  
 
A remote virtualized environment is an enabler. 
When the HiFLiX was in the early stages of design, we 
considered flying MIT students out to Pasadena, CA 
where NASA JPL is located, so they could run security 
exercises on local mission systems. Considering the 
transnational travel and security considerations due to 
the sensitive nature of systems at JPL, the event 
seemed financially and logistically challenging to 
execute. Virtualizing the mission system environment 
provided us the flexibility to accommodate all students 
interested in participating without concerning ourselves 
with the logistics of travel and garnering student 
credentials to the JPL site. Hosting this event in the 
cloud also enabled us to successfully conduct the 
HiFLiX exercise without directly exposing JPL 
networks or JPL system resources to the attacks carried 
out by the participants. The virtualized environment 
was also inexpensive to host in Amazon Web Services 
(AWS) where we stood up 80+ systems and 20 virtual 
private clouds for a total cost of $2,327.32. The whole 
setup, from conceptualization to implementation, took 
slightly over a month with about 200 man-hours of 
effort. AWS also provided tools for usage analytics and 
other data collection capabilities which were valuable 
after the event was completed, to support future 
improvements of the exercise. Future HiFLiXs should 
also consider conducting remote and virtualized 
environments to provide flexibility to students, 
increased security control to the industry partner that 
provides a real-life system for the exercise and to 
minimize expenses. 
 
Thoughts on HiFLiX replicability. We acknowledge 
that this study was conducted in an environment and 
with a partnership primed for success. Not every 
institution has the academic resources of MIT or the 
intellectual resources of NASA. To successfully 
replicate the HiFLiX in other settings, we will share 
some lessons learned in the organizational setup of the 
exercise. 
Some may argue that MIT is a unique institution 
because of its student base and academic resources, 
which could limit the broader applicability of HiFLiX. 
We would, however, argue that there are good reasons 
to assume that a similar approach could be successful 
also elsewhere. The students who took part in the 
exercise all had different levels of previous experience, 
and were at various points in their computer science 
education. There were no location-based benefits for 
these students (everything was conducted virtually) 
and the resources provided to them were all open-
source and freely available. A similar spectrum of 
students at other schools could thus well have 
equivalent experiences. The guidance provided to the 
students by MIT CSAIL security researchers centered 
around tips on using the open-source tools. There is no 
doubt that other security researchers and instructors 
could provide similar general guidance. 
While in the case of this HiFLiX, NASA JPL 
made a sophisticated mission system available to the 
participants, this need not be the case. We believe the 
value of the exercise was not in the sophistication of 
the system provided, but rather in the realness of the 
mission system. With this said, it is not crucial for the 
industry partner to create something new or intricate 
for the students. Any real system can provide great 
value compared to fabricated environments, and any 
strong partnership between an academic institution and 
industry could be the starting point for a successful 
HiFLiX. In other words, the intellectual resources of 
NASA are not required to replicate this learning 
experience.  
MIT’s CSAIL and NASA’s JPL had been working 
together on various research and development projects 
for over a year before running the HiFLiX. This 
enabled the JPL team to learn about the students at 
MIT who would be interested in such an exercise and 
select a mission system that has features that could 
appeal to these students. For example, most MIT 
students that are interested in security focus on 
systems. Rather than JPL building out a HiFLiX based 
on their robust database structures, JPL provided a 
mission system for the exercise. The pre-existing 
working relationships between the two organizations 
also enabled a degree of expectation setting for the 
exercise. Expectation setting was important so that 
there was no disappointing outcome for either party. 
Both MIT and JPL were aligned on what each 
respective organization hoped to achieve. The 
relationship also made communication between MIT 
and JPL before and during the exercise 
straightforward. The JPL HiFLiX lead was in constant 
communication with the MIT lead at CSAIL 
concerning potential issues and progress as the week 
progressed. Again, communication was simple because 
of the existing trust and rapport between the two 
parties. 
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7.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have proposed a new delivery 
method for cybersecurity education. Introductory 
cybersecurity related skills and learning outcomes are 
in the process of becoming curricular requirements in 
most accredited computing degree programs. Our main 
contribution is thus given by offering an approach to 
achieving these learning outcomes, through the 
proposed HiFLiX concept. Although our experiment 
does not provide us with conclusive results as to the 
efficiency of the exercise as a teaching/learning 
activity, we believe that the approach is promising and 
merits future study and development. The preliminary 
qualitative results show that the exercise was valuable 
to students as well as the hosting organizations. 
The first goal of the experiment was to evaluate if a 
HiFLiX exercise would satisfy intended cybersecurity 
learning outcomes. We conclude that most students 
who participated in the exercise demonstrated 
assessable proficiency in core cybersecurity concepts, 
through achievement of learning outcomes on the 
understand and apply levels of the Bloom’s Revised 
Taxonomy. 
The second goal, to gather data for cybersecurity-
related research and development tasks was reached by 
the generation of an exercise dataset, and the third goal 
was reached by discovering previously unknown 
vulnerabilities in the NASA JPL mission system. 
One of the main purposes of academic education is 
to teach students how to synthesize information, 
principles, concepts, and other materials to be able to 
apply it to novel situations. While understanding 
fundamentals is unarguably of importance, 
cybersecurity expertise also requires an understanding 
of tools, tactics and procedures and how they may be 
applied. In this paper we have addressed the question 
of how to enhance cybersecurity learning and to 
provide students in computing sciences with an 
opportunity to develop cyber-skills. Our proposed 
solution, the HiFLiX teaching/learning activity, shows 
that this can be done in a way that offers several 
positive outcomes.  
The suggested exercises contribute in preparing the 
participating students for cybersecurity challenges they 
may encounter in their future professional roles and 
increase their motivation for pursuing subsequent 
cybersecurity studies. The exercises also promote 
constructive alignment between overarching security 
educational goals and intended learning outcomes of 
specific software reliability and assurance courses, by 
fostering skills required for independent, innovative 
and critical thinking. 
Future work includes follow-up studies of 
upcoming HiFLiX exercises during the spring semester 
of 2019. This includes a planned study on the potential 
benefit of incorporating them as a mandatory part of 
the curricula within an engineering program. We also 
plan to investigate how constructivist learning methods 
can be further used in HiFLiX exercises so they can 
become an even more accessible tool for security 
education, serving as a missing link between computer 
security education and cybersecurity training. 
 
8.  Acknowledgments 
 
The experiment was setup and executed at the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of 
Technology, under a contract with the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. Bryan Johnson 
and Eddie Babbe from the Cyber Defense Engineering 
and Research Group at JPL assisted with experiment 
setup and management. Matt Derenski from the JPL 
Office of the Chief Information Officer assisted in the 
creation of the cloud infrastructure. 
The authors would also like to thank Howard 
Shrobe and Lori Glover of CyberSecurity@CSAIL for 
supporting the HiFLiX. The first author was supported 
by grants from the Swedish Armed Forces and the 
Fulbright Program, both which are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
9. References  
 
[1] ISACA, “State of Cybersecurity 2018: Workforce 
Development”, Technical Report, Information Systems Audit 
and Control Association, 2018. 
 
[2] Steve Morgan, “Demand for cybersecurity talent rises 
sharply”, CSO Online, January 11, 2018. 
  
[3] Diana Burley, Matt Bishop, Siddharth Kaza, David 
Gibson, Elizabeth Hawthorne, Scott Buck, “ACM Joint Task 
Force on Cybersecurity Education”, in Proceedings of the 
2017 ACM SIGCSE Technical Symposium on Computer 
Science Education, Seattle, WA, March 2017, pp. 683-684. 
 
[4] B. L. Yoder, “Engineering by the numbers”, American 
Society for Engineering Education, Washington, DC, 2017. 
 
[5] Andrew McGettrick, Lilian N. Cassel, Melissa Dark, 
Elizabeth K. Hawthorne, and John Impagliazzo, “Toward 
Curricular Guidelines for Cybersecurity”, in Proceedings of 
the 45th ACM Technical Symposium on Computer Science 
Education, Atlanta, GA, 2013, pp. 81-82. 
 
[6] Michael Hogan and Elaine Newton, “Report on Strategic 
U.S. Government Engagement in International 
Standardization to Achieve U.S. Objectives for 
Cybersecurity”, Report 8074, Volume 1, National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), 2015. 
 
Page 7561
  
[7] Matt Bishop, “What is Computer Security?”, IEEE 
Security & Privacy, 1(1), 2003, pp. 67–69. 
 
[8] David E. Bell and Leonard LaPadula, “Secure Computer 
Systems: Mathematical Foundations and Model”, Technical 
Report M74-244, MITRE Corp., Bedford, MA, 1973. 
 
[9] Wm. Arthur Conklin, Raymond E. Cline, Jr., and Tiffany 
Roosa, “Re-engineering Cybersecurity Education in the US: 
An Analysis of the Critical Factors”, in Proceedings of the 
47th Hawaii International Conference on System Science, 
2014, pp. 2006-2014. 
 
[10] ABET, “Engineering change: Lessons from leaders on 
modernizing higher education engineering curriculum”, 
Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology, Inc., 
Fall Issue Brief, 2017.  
 
[11] Willis H. Ware, “Security controls for computer 
systems: Report of defense science board task force on 
computer security”, Report R-609-1, RAND Corporation, 
1970. 
 
[12] Jerome Saltzer and Michael Schroeder, “The Protection 
of Information in Computer Systems”, in Proceedings of the 
IEEE, 63(9), 1975, pp. 1278-1308. 
 
[13] Peter J. Denning, Douglas E. Comer, David Gries, 
Michael C. Mulder, Allen Tucker, A. Joe Turner, and Paul R. 
Young, “Computing as a Discipline”, Communications of the 
ACM, 32(1), 1989, pp. 9-23. 
 
[14] Gary A. Ford and Norman E. Gibbs, “A Master of 
Software Engineering Curriculum: Recommendations from 
the Software Engineering Institute”, IEEE Computer, 22(9), 
1989, pp. 59-71. 
 
[15] Wolfgang A. Halang, “A curriculum for real-time 
computer and control systems engineering”, IEEE 
Transactions on Education, 33(2), 1990, pp. 171-178. 
 
[16] Cynthia E. Irvine, “Goals for Computer Security 
Education”, in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy, Los Alamitos, CA, 1996, pp. 24-25. 
 
[17] Cynthia E. Irvine, Shiu-Kai Chin, and Deborah Frincke, 
“Integrating Security into the Curriculum”, IEEE Computer, 
31(12), 1998, pp. 26-30. 
 
[18] John Biggs and Catherine Tang, “Teaching for Quality 
Learning at University, 4th ed.”, Open University Press, 
Berkshire, UK, 2011. 
 
[19] Bertrand Meyer, “Software Engineering in the 
Academy”, IEEE Computer, 34(5), 2001, pp. 28-35. 
 
[20] T.C. Lethbridge et al., “SE2004: Recommendations for 
Undergraduate Software Engineering Curricula”, IEEE 
Software, 23(6), 2006, pp. 19-25. 
 
[21] R. A. Clark and H. A. Schmidt, “A national strategy to 
secure cyberspace”, The President’s Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Board, Washington, DC, 2003. 
 
[22] Samuel T. Redwine (ed.), “Software Assurance: A 
Guide to the Common Body of Knowledge to Produce, 
Acquire and Sustain Secure Software, Version 1.1”, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2006. 
 
[23] Nancy R. Mead et al., “Software Assurance Curriculum 
Project Volume I: Master of Software Assurance Reference 
Curriculum”, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie 
Mellon University, Technical Report CMU/SEI-2010-TR-
005, 2010. 
 
[24] Carol Woody, Nancy Mead, and Dan Shoemaker, 
“Foundations for Software Assurance”, in Proceedings of the 
45th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 
2012, pp. 5368-5374. 
 
[25] Tom Hilburn and Dan Shoemaker, “Engineering 
Competencies”, in Nancy R. Mead & Carol C. Woody (eds.) 
Cyber Security Engineering: A Practical Approach for 
Systems and Software Assurance, SEI Series in Software 
Engineering, Addison-Wesley, 2017. 
 
[26] Diana L. Burley, Matt Bishop, Scott Buck, Joseph J. 
Ekstrom, Lynn Futcher, David Gibson, Elizabeth K. 
Hawthorne, Siddharth Kaza, Yair Levy, Herbert Mattord, and 
Allen Parrish, “Cybersecurity Curricula 2017”, Version 1.0 
Report, December 2017. 
 
[27] Jessica Anne Chisholm, “Analysis on the perceived 
usefulness of hands-on virtual labs in cybersecurity classes”, 
Ph.D. Thesis in Computer Science, Colorado Technical 
University, 2015. 
 
[28] Daniel Conte de Leon, Christopher E. Goes, Michael A. 
Haney, and Axel W. Krings, “ADLES: Specifying, 
deploying, and sharing hands-on cyber-exercises”, 
Computers & Security, 74, 2018, pp. 12-40. 
 
[29] DEFCON, “DEFCON 26 - Capture the Flag”, Website. 
Available: https://defcon.org/html/defcon-26/dc-26-ctf.html 
 
[30] ECSC, “European Cyber Security Challenge”, Website. 
Available: https://www.europeancybersecuritychallenge.eu 
 
[31] CCDC, “U.S. National Collegiate Cyber Defense 
Competition”, Website. Available: http://nationalccdc.org 
 
[32] Eric M. Hutchins, Michael J. Cloppert, and Rohan M. 
Amin, “Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense 
Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion 
Kill Chains”, in Proceedings of the 6th International 
Conference on Information Warfare and Security, 2011, pp. 
113-125. 
 
[33] Chloë Marshall, “Montessori Education: A Review of 
the Evidence Base”, Science of Learning, 2(11), 2017. 
 
Page 7562
